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ERIE-YORK DOCTRINE DOES NOT GOVERN FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Hanna v. Plumer
380 U.S. 460 (1965)
Plaintiff filed a complaint in a federal district court in Massachusetts
against the executor of an alleged negligent driver for injuries resulting from a
collision between plaintiff's auto and that of the decedent. Jurisdiction was
based on diversity of citizenship and service was made pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) (1)' by leaving copies of the summons and
complaint with defendant's wife at his residence. In his answer defendant
claimed the service was invalid since plaintiff had not complied with a Massa-
chusetts statute which required that a creditor of a deceased serve the per-
sonal representative "in hand." 2 Subsequently defendant moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that Erie and its progeny3 compelled the application
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1):
The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish
the person making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be
made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally
or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent autho-
rized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
2 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 197, § 9 (1955) provides in part:
Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall not be
held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased which is not commenced
within one year from the time of his giving bond for the performance of his
trust, or to such an action which is commenced within said year unless before
the expiration thereof the writ in such action has been served by delivery in
hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof accepted by him
or a notice stating the name of the estate, the name and address of the creditor,
the amount of the claim and the court in which the action has been brought has
been filed in the proper registry of probate ....
3 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842). Erie gave rise to the "substance-procedure" dichotomy and the
federal policy opposed to forum-shopping and discrimination against residents of the
forum state. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), modified the "substance-
procedure" doctrine by invoking the now familiar "outcome determinative" test which
required that the result in federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal
rules determine the outcome of a litigation as it would be if tried in a state court.
In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), and Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), the Court used this test to apply state law to
rules 3 and 23 respectively. Ragan held that the filing of a complaint pursuant to rule 3
was not sufficient to toll the state statute of limitations if the state law required not only
the filing of a complaint but personal service upon the defendant to toll the statute.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of the Massachusetts statute in lieu of rule 4(d) (1). The district court, rely-
ing on Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co.4 and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 5
granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the
Massachusetts statute was a substantive rather than a procedural matter and
affirmed.6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari7 and reversed,8
holding inter alia that the Erie doctrine9 does not compel application of a
conflicting state rule in lieu of rule 4(d) (1).
Although the Supreme Court may never have been faced with a direct
clash between state law and the federal rules prior to Plumer, the lower courts
have on occasion been confronted with the issue.10 There have also been
numerous occasions in which courts have chosen state law to fill the interstices
left by the terse language of the federal rules. 1 It is in these latter situations
Cohen held that when a state statute requires a deposit of security for reasonable litiga-
tion expenses as a prerequisite to bringing a stockholder's derivative suit in state court,
such statute should be applicable to a like action based on diversity of citizenship, brought
in a federal district court in that state. It is noteworthy that the Court in Plumer does
not see these last two cases as presenting a direct clash between the federal rule and the
state law. Rather the Court characterizes them as instances where the state law was not
within the scope of the federal rule and thus was applicable under traditional Erie
analysis. See text accompanying note 41 infra. The "outcome determinative" test
remained basically unchanged until Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S.
525 (1958), was decided. There the York test was made subject to "affirmative counter-
vailing considerations" of federal policy. In the instant case defendant specifically relied
on Erie and York, alleging that use of rule 4(d)(1) would alter the outcome of the
case. For a more detailed history of the Erie decision, see Boner, "Erie v. Tompkins:
A Study in Judicial Precedent," 40 Texas L. Rev. 509 (1962).
4 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
5 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
6 Hanna v. Plumer, 331 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1964), 78 Harv. L. Rev. 673 (1965). The
First Circuit held the statute substantive on the grounds that it was a clear expression
of state legislative policy. Plaintiff had also filed the alternative notice in the registry
of probate, but the district court held it invalid.
7 Hanna v. Plumer, 379 U.S. 813 (1964).
8 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
9 See note 3 supra.
10 380 U.S. at 472. See Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.
1965), discussed in note 17 infra; Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759
(Sth Cir. 1963), discussed in text accompanying note 18 infra; Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960), discussed in note 38 infra; Monarch Ins. Co. v.
Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960), discussed in text accompanying note 20 infra.
1 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 3: Plaintiff must satisfy the state requirements for tolling the
statute of limitations in federal as well as state court. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 530 (1949). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4: Under rule 4(d) (3) the amenability of a foreign
corporation to suit is determined by the law of the state. Arrowsmith v. United Press
Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). See generally 2 Moore, Federal Practice ff 4.25[7]
(2d ed. 1964). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8: State Law controls the burden of proof on particular
defenses. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Fed. R. Civ. P. 13: State law prevails
when the counterclaim is barred by the statute of limitations. Keckley v. Payton, 157
F. Supp. 820 (N.D.W. Va. 1958). Fed. R. Civ. P. 14: While the right to proceed in a
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that the Erie-York doctrine is omnipresent. These results have been criti-
cized, 12 and some authors have even suggested that Congress might well con-
sider whether diversity jurisdiction should be continued. 13 But after Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op.'4 some appellate courts began, in certain in-
stances, to exercise a new freedom in determining the validity and the ap-
plicable scope of the federal rules15 by using two different theories to attenuate
the strict "substance-procedure" or "outcome determinative" analysis.
The first of these theories operated under the rationale that Congress, in
third party action is established by federal rule, such right depends upon the existence of
a state created liability. General Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.
1965); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Busy Elec. Co., 294 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1961). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 17: State law determines the real party in interest. Wright v. Schebler Co., 37 F.R.D.
319 (S.D. Iowa 1965). But see Beckley v. Trustees of Orangebury Regional Hosp., 35
F.R.D. 516 (E.D.S.C. 1964). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23: State law determines the extent to which
an effort to obtain stockholders' action is a condition precedent to the maintenance of a
derivative action and federal law determines the method of pleading. Steinberg v.
Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950). State rules which do not conflict with the
federal rule, but which are actually outside its scope are applicable. Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Fed. R. Civ. P. 25: State law determines whether
an action abates with the death of a party. Perkins v. Rich, 204 F. Supp. 98 (D. Del.
1962). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 34: State law governs what is privileged in a diversity action.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1962); Cimijotti v.
Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621 (NJ). Iowa 1963). Fed. R. Civ. P. 37: State rule of privileged
communications shall prevail over provisions in rule 37 for failure to answer questions
asked while taking deposition. Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y.
1960). Fed. R. Civ. P. 43: Most federal courts follow state law as to what constitutes a
privileged communication. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1962); cf. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960); see
generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 320, 331 (1964). Fed. R. Civ. P. 50: Whether it is proper
to apply a state or federal test of sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict
where federal jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship has not yet been
decided by the United States Supreme Court. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 US.
437, 444-45 (1959). The following courts would apply state standards: Dean v. Southern
R.R., 327 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1964); Evans v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335,
342 n.2 (2d Cir. 1963). Fed. R. Civ. P. 71A: State law should be consulted to determine
what constitutes real property for the purpose of federal condemnation. United States v.
Certain Property, 306 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1962). See generally Hawkins, "The Erie Doctrine
Versus the Federal Rules," in Proceedings of the 1964 Nineteenth Annual Miss. Law
Institute on Fed. Practice and Procedure 297.
12 EHll, "The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution," 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 427 (1958).
Professor Hill concludes that the federal rules should be amended in order to provide
for enforcement of substantial state policies while at the same time preserving federal
policies.
13 See, e.g., Quigley, "Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment," 60 Mich. L.
Rev. 1031 (1962). After an attack on the present situation the author concludes that a
congressional amendment to the Rules Enabling Act and the federal rules is necessary.
14 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
15 See generally Vestal, "Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection," 48 Iowa L. Rev.
248 (1962).
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passing the Rules Enabling Act,16 was acting under its constitutional authority
derived from article III and the necessary and proper clause, to prescribe the
practice and procedure in the federal courts, and when the Supreme Court
promulgated a rule pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, a prima face pre-
sumption arose that such rule was procedural and thus not violative of the
Erie doctrine.'2 In Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright16 the issue was
whether the district court was required to follow a Louisiana abandonment-
for-failure-to-prosecute statute instead of controlling its own docket by using
rule 41(b). The Fifth Circuit held that the abandonment provision was in a
penumbral area-a twilight zone between substance and procedure-and in
such cases, where there is a congressional mandate (the rules) supported by
constitutional authority, the federal rule should be applied without regard to
"outcome determinative" considerations. 19 Thus for courts applying this
theory, a federal rule which can be interpreted as covering the controversy
will be given effect unless it is demonstrated that the rule is clearly sub-
stantive.
The second theory devised to test the applicability of a federal rule in-
volves a balancing of federal and state policy. In Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach"2
a Florida rule provided that written statements taken from an injured person
were inadmissible in any civil action unless a copy of the statement was first
given to the injured person. The district court applied the state statute in lieu
of rule 43 (a) but the Fifth Circuit reversed holding that the federal rule and
the Rules Enabling Act must be viewed as strong federal policy giving federal
courts the capacity to regulate the manner by which facts are to be presented.
Moreover, since the overall state and federal practice both generally favored
16 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964), which provides in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and pro-
cedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury ....
17 See Moss v. Associated Transp. Inc., 344 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1965). In this case
the issue was whether the district court judge could, pursuant to rule 42(b), separate the
issues of liability for trial prior to the issues of damages when Tennessee law would
not have permitted such separation. In holding the application of rule 42(b) valid the
court stated that the Rules Enabling Act authorized the promulgation of rule 42(b)
and "the importance of maintaining uniform procedure in federal trials calls for a
clear showing of possible substantive impact before departing from the federal rules."
Id. at 27.
18 322 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1963).
19 Other courts applying a similar rationale: Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d
Cir. 1959) [upholding rule 25(a)]; D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904
(1st Cir. 1958) (upholding rule 14). See generally Comment, "The Constitutional Power
of Congress to Control Procedure in the Federal Courts," 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 560 (1961).
20 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960). For a criticism of the balancing test and of the
Monarch decision, see Smith, "Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federal-
ism in Diversity Litigation," 36 Tul. L. Rev. 443 (1962).
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disclosure, admission of the statement would not thwart the basic state policy,
notwithstanding that it violated the particular statute. In Arrowsmitk v.
United Press Int'121 the issue was whether rule 4(d) (3) was to be interpreted
as impliedly requiring a federal standard of doing sufficient business within
the state for amenability to process. Concluding that state policy as reflected
by the state standard should prevail the Second Circuit stated:
[W]e fully concede that the constitutional doctrine announced in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins... would not prevent Congress or its rule-
making delegate [the Supreme Court] from authorizing a district
court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign corporation although the
state court would not. . . . But we find no federal policy that
should ... override valid state laws as to the subjection of foreign
corporations to suit, in the absence of direction by federal statute
or rule.22
Hence, under the balancing test, a court chooses the applicable law and
tests the validity of a federal rule on the basis of whether a particular policy
-federal or state-is stronger,23 or whether the policies are consistent in
purpose, in which case the federal policy reflected by the rules is controlling. 24
It will be observed that under these theories the York "outcome deter-
minative" test has little if any explicit effect upon the courts' analyses of what
law should be applied.2 5 Instead the courts treat the problem in terms of the
basic prohibition extracted from Erie-federal courts should not infringe upon
state substantive law when jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizen-
ship. Consequently, the resolution of this problem under these two theories
depends on the court's ability to characterize the particular area affected by a
federal rule as substance or procedure.
In completing the break28 from an Erie-York based analysis of a federal
21 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), overruling Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc.,
282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
22 Id. at 226. Other cases applying a similar balancing rationale: Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1962) (applying state physician-pa-
tient privilege to rule 26) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960)
(applying state rule prohibiting a declaratory judgment action in lieu of rule 57). The
balancing test finds some support in Hill, supra note 12, at 595-96.
23 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 21, at 226.
24 See note 20 supra.
25 In D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958), the issue
was whether rule 14 could be used when the state did not provide for third-party im-
pleader. In deciding that rule 14 was authorized by the Rules Enabling Act and therefore
procedural the court states:
If cases like Guaranty Trust Co. v. York . . . contain language which might
seem to point to the opposite conclusion, we are prepared, if it were necessary,
to hold that the language used must be confined to the special fact situations
with which the Court was then undertaking to deal; and so regarded we do
not think those cases controlling here.
Id. at 910-11.
28 The word "completing" is used because the Court states:
Although this Court has never before been confronted with a case where the
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rule, Plumer expressly states that "the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins [does
not constitute] the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the applica-
bility of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure."2 7 The Court admits that "the
broad command of Erie was therefore identical to that of the Enabling Act:
federal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.'2s
But there the similarity ends because each was created for a different purpose.
Erie was partly an attempt to effectuate the equal protection clause by pre-
venting discrimination against residents of the forum state and partly an
attempt to eliminate forum-shopping; York was an outgrowth of attempts to
effectuate Erie. On the other hand, the federal rules were created to avoid
local rules and to produce uniformity of procedure in the federal courts. Be-
hind the rules stands an act of Congress, and when the applicability of a
federal rule is challenged, the question facing the court is not merely one of
effecting the policies of Erie and York; rather it is whether "the Advisory
Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that
the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional restrictions." 29 This question can be answered in the affirmative
only after a showing that the rule clearly regulates substantive rights and
duties created by state law, or that it transcends constitutional rights. The
possibility that the federal rule may change the outcome of the case and
contravene York now seems of minor importance unless the variation is so
significant that it denies equal protection of the law.
Stated succinctly, the Plumer rationale involves two steps: (1) whether
a particular rule exceeds the congressional mandate of the Rules Enabling
Act 0 by attempting to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,"3'
and (2) whether the rule itself is constitutional. The first step involves the
traditional "substance-procedure" classification in which the Court provides
a means for deciding the dose case: only matters not rationally capable of
being classified as procedural are within the "substantive right" prohibition
of the Rules Enabling Act.
But what is procedure? The Court uses the rather nebulous definition
originally stated in Sibback v. Wilson:3 2 "the judicial process for enforcing
applicable Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law of the relevant
State, courts of appeals faced with such dashes have rightly discerned the
implications of our decisions.
380 U.S. at 472.
The Court then quotes from and approves the rationale used in the Lumbermen's
Mutual case discussed in text accompanying note 18 supra. Thus arises the inference
that by approving the break from a strict Erie analysis upon its first opportunity to
consider the issue, the Court is completing a process of evolution originally started
with Byrd and carried on by some appellate courts.
27 380 U.S. at 469-70.
28 380 U.S. at 465.
29 380 U.S. at 471.
80 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The text of the section is at note 16 supra.
31 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
82 312 U.S. 1 (1941). See generally Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 112-14
(1964), 26 Ohio St. L.J. 679 (1965).
[Vol. 27
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.13 3 The breadth of this
definition of procedure must be further extended by the modifying term
"rational," which is intended to eliminate disputes in the unclear area sep-
arating substance from procedure. The decision in Plumer does not establish
any new tests for distinguishing substance from procedure, but it does pro-
pound a test similar to a burden of proof: unless it is clearly demonstrated
that the rule regulates substance, it is presumed to be procedural. Restated, if
reasonable men could differ in classifying the particular rule, then it is
rationally procedural and must be applied in lieu of the conflicting state rule.
But even though rationally procedural, the rule itself must be constitu-
tional. The manner in which a procedural rule might be unconstitutional is
not expressly treated, but the Court does mention the equal protection clause
as one of the grounds for the Erie decision and presumably a particular rule
would violate that clause if it were so different from a corresponding state
procedure that it caused grave discrimination against citizens of the state in
favor of noncitizens. Furthermore, a rule could undoubtedly be procedural and
still violate one of the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution, especially due process.
After replacing the Erie doctrine with a new basis for testing a federal
rule, the Court states that even if a difference in outcome were the only test,
the federal rule in this case would still have prevailed. Many times after
litigation begins, unanticipated "substance-procedure" conflicts often arise
and a resolution of such conflicts will usually affect the outcome of the litiga-
tion, depending upon whether federal or state law is applied. But no matter
what law is applied once the conflict has arisen, it will have little or no effect
upon a litigant's choice of forum, nor will it foster discrimination against
citizens. For these policy reasons the Court states that in the future the "out-
come determinative" test is to be applied only from a prospective point of
view, i.e., whether a litigant would sue in a federal court rather than a state
court because he knew beforehand that his suit would come out differently.
However, such differences in outcome must be substantial and not merely due
to the fact that the federal and state court systems are not identical. In
Plumer, after testing rule 4(d) (1) by the prospective difference-in-outcome
analysis, the Court concluded that application of the rule would foreseeably
only 'have altered the method of serving process. It would not have changed
the outcome nor would it have raised the kind of discrimination feared in Erie.
Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion argues that the majority's
rationale establishes the federal rules as a body of law absolute, subject only
to a simple forum-shopping test.34 If this is true, courts could be induced to
extend the scope of particular rules beyond their express provisions to include
all rationally procedural matters in order to enforce a policy of uniform pro-
cedure in the district courts. Under such a result, cases applying state proce-
dure under the Erie-York doctrine could be overruled for using an incorrect
33 312 U.S. at 14.
34 380 U.S. at 475-76.
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test. Other cases applying state procedure under the balancing test35 could be
overruled on the grounds that Plumer establishes sufficiently strong federal
policy in the federal rules area to override conflicting state policy even in
situations where the rules do not expressly apply. 6
But, does Plumer go too far? Mr. Justice Harlan believes it does for he
argues that making the federal rules virtually inviolate will result in frus-
trating legitimate state policy. 7 And possibly there are areas which may be
rationally classified as procedural, but which may also involve substantial and
contrary state policy, the ignoring of which may greatly affect the outcome of
the case and thereby foster the Erie fears of forum-shopping and discrimina-
tion. 8 Perhaps these are the situations which the Court had in mind when it
reserved some flexibility short of absolute application of the federal rules.89
Since Plumer was a direct clash between a federal rule and a contrary
state law, the prima facie superiority of the rules in such situations in the
future is clear. However, the greater effect of the Plumer rationale will center
85 See notes 20-22 supra.
86 This would seem to be especially applicable to the Arrowsmith case discussed in
text accompanying note 21 supra, where the Second Circuit expressly stated that it
would have applied a federal standard if it could have found a sufficiently strong federal
policy compelling such a result.
37 380 U.S. at 475. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brei, 311 F.2d 463
(2d Cir. 1962), where the Second Circuit used a similar rationale in applying the state
physician-patient privilege to rule 26.
88 As to the idea that substantial state interest should be recognized, see Hill,
supra note 12, at 595-96. Consider the problem presented by Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Charneski, supra note 22, where the issue was whether a Wisconsin decision expressly
prohibiting the use of declaratory judgment actions by insurance companies should
be applied in lieu of rule 57. Wisconsin has a unique practice which allows the injured
party to sue the insurer directly and obviates the necessity of first suing the alleged
tortfeasor. The Seventh Circuit feared that allowing the insurer to obtain a declaratory
judgment of its liability against its insured would frustrate the state "substantive"
policy and give rise to forum-shopping. The court therefore refused to apply the
federal rule by using the balancing test. Presumably, a declaratory judgment is part
of the overall "judicial process" for enforcing rights and duties, is rationally procedural,
and thus is applicable under the Plumer test. The Allstate case could be overruled. But
is this a desirable result? The Seventh Circuit's fears seem likely to materialize under
such a result. Consider also the virtually uniform practice of recognizing state rules
of privilege in the application of rules 26, 34, and 37. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Brei, supra note 22; Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Iowa 1963);
Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally Annot.,
95 AL..R.2d 320, 331 (1964). Are these privileges "rationally procedural" under Plumer
when considered in the context of the federal rules involved?
39 The Court reveals this intention when it states:
[A] court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in
the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the
degree to which the Rule makes the character and result of the federal litiga-
tion stray from the course it would follow in state courts ....
380 U.S. at 473.
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around the cases in which the courts must decide exactly what is implicitly
included in the language of any particular rule. For example, in Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer Co.,40 the Court, although it did not choose to do so, could
have held that rule 3 implicitly provided that filing the complaint tolls the
statute of limitations as well as commences the action. In fact the Court in
Plumer distinguishes Ragan as a case in which "the scope of the Federal Rule
was not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore there being no
Federal Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the en-
forcement of state law."41 And yet in Plumer the Court is willing to read into
rule 4(d) (1) that in-hand service is not required in federal courts.42 Mr.
Justice Harlan4 3 as well as one of the first district courts
44 to treat Plumer
agree that this distinction is a false one.
In conclusion, the rationale of the Plumer case can be seen as presenting
two general, but perhaps contradictory, proposals. On the one hand the
authoritative language of the Court's opinion can be read to permit a district
court to construe a federal rule as impliedly including all matters which are
rationally procedural but do not give rise to equal protection arguments. Such
power could be pursued under the aegis of the federal goal of uniform proce-
dure and the article III provision for a federal court system. But, if this
rationale is accepted an accompanying result will be the emergence of a vast
federal common law based on how the various federal jurisdictions interpret
the federal rules.
On the other hand, if Ragan as well as Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp.45 are still good law, one can argue that the rules should be strictly con-
strued and limited to their explicit statements. Any interstices left by this
interpretation should then be filled in by state law. Although the first proposal
is arguable under the language used in Plumer and perhaps would be the most
effective method of freeing federal courts from local rules, the fact that the
Plumer decision does not expressly overrule or discredit any of the Erie
progeny, but cites many of those cases for support, points to the conclusion
that a strict reading of the rules is more likely to be followed.
46
40 337 U.S. 530 (1949). See note 3 supra for a discussion of Ragan.
41 380 U.S. at 470. (Emphasis added.)
42 The Court states: "Here, of course, the clash is unavoidable; rule 4(d) (1)
says-implicitly, but with unmistakable clarity-that in hand service is not required
in federal courts." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
43 Id. at 476-77.
44 Sylvesteri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 244 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The
facts presented a situation almost identical to that in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co.,
discussed in notes 3 & 11 supra, the issue being whether the statute of limitations was
tolled by merely filing the complaint under rule 3 or by personal service within 60 days
after the statute of limitations expired as required by state law. In holding rule 3 ap-
plicable the court expressed concern over the fact that Plumer did not expressly overrule
Ragan, but concluded that the Supreme Court after Plumer would no longer follow
Ragan.
45 337 U.S. 541 (1949), discussed at note 3 supra.
46 If this indication is valid, then it seems that Sylvesteri v. Warner & Swasey Co.,
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It is important to remember that the Court views Plumer as presenting
to it, for the first time, 47 a direct confrontation of state law with one of the
federal rules. In order to dispel any doubts about the propriety of the rules
or the federal goal of uniformity of procedure, it was necessary for the Court
to speak in strong and affirmative terms. However, now that it has confirmed
the constitutionality of federal power to control the practice and procedure in
the federal court system, perhaps in future decisions it will explain more
precisely the extent that a court, in testing the validity or interpreting the
scope of a federal rule, may consider the degree to which a federal rule can
permissibly vary the litigation from the course it would have followed in the
state court.
supra note 44, was incorrectly decided. See Kuchenig v. California Co., 350 F.2d 551,
553-57 (5th Cir. 1965), which provides support for the view that, after Plumer, past
decisions like Ragan and Cohen and the rest of the Erie progeny still have precedential
value in the federal rules area.
47 See note 26 supra.
